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ABSTRACT
In this paper, the interactions and energy exchange decisions
of a number of geographically distributed storage units are
studied under decision-making involving end-users. In particular,
a noncooperative game is formulated between customer-owned
storage units where each storage unit’s owner can decide on
whether to charge or discharge energy with a given probability
so as to maximize a utility that reflects the tradeoff between
the monetary transactions from charging/discharging and the
penalty from power regulation. Unlike existing game-theoretic
works which assume that players make their decisions rationally
and objectively, we use the new framework of prospect theory
(PT) to explicitly incorporate the users’ subjective perceptions
of their expected utilities. For the two-player game, we show
the existence of a proper mixed Nash equilibrium for both the
standard game-theoretic case and the case with PT considerations.
Simulation results show that incorporating user behavior via PT
reveals several important insights into load management as well
as economics of energy storage usage. For instance, the results
show that deviations from conventional game theory, as predicted
by PT, can lead to undesirable grid loads and revenues thus
requiring the power company to revisit its pricing schemes and
the customers to reassess their energy storage usage choices.
Index Terms— Smart grid, game theory, prospect theory,
energy storage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Customer participation in energy management is seen as an
integral feature of the smart grid [1]. In particular, the introduc-
tion of customer-owned storage units will provide the means for
active user participation in managing energy transactions in the
grid. For instance, these storage units provide the grid with the
opportunity of storing energy at customer premises and they also
allow customers to sell any surplus of energy available at their
premises [1]. This represents a key feature for deploying smart
grid applications such as demand response [2]–[6].
The integration of storage units into the smart grid, particu-
larly at the customer side, requires overcoming many technical
challenges [7]–[13]. The authors in [7] addressed the problem of
intermittent renewable energy generation by using energy storage
to deal with dynamic loads and sources. In [8], the authors
studied the use of storage units as a means for complementing the
stochastic generation of wind farms. In this work, the authors also
investigate the impact of the presence of such storage units on
the market price. Other related game-theoretic solutions for smart
grid pricing and energy management are discussed in [10]–[13].
Game theory has been a popular tool for smart grid design.
However, most existing works assume that customers will abide
by the rules of the game and act in a rational manner [2], [3],
[10]–[15]. Indeed, none of these works incorporates the realistic
behavior of the users which, in practice, can deviate from the
conventional, rational norm set by game theory as observed in
[16]–[18]. In this respect, prospect theory (PT), a Nobel-prize
winning theory, provides the needed tools to explain how real-life
user decisions can deviate from those predicted by conventional
game theory [19]–[21]. In particular, PT has shown that, in
real life, users often act irrationally when faced with risk and
uncertainty of outcome, as is the case in the smart grid, where the
decisions of the customers are largely interdependent leading to
risky outcomes. These irrational decisions can stem not only from
the users’ behavior but also from computational errors occurring
at the smart grid devices that are often resource-constrained.
There are many studies that have applied PT to solve problems
in the social sciences [19], [22], [23] as well as recent efforts to
study the influence of end-users on wireless networks [24]–[28].
However, our work here is the first to break new ground in using
PT to study end-user influence on the workings of the smart grid.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a new frame-
work for energy management in the smart grid using the tools
of prospect theory. In particular, we formulate a noncooperative
game between the customer-owned storage units, in which the
decision of each customer explicitly incorporates its subjective
perception on the actions taken by other customers. In this game,
each customer can decide whether to charge its storage unit or
sell the available surplus to the grid, while optimizing a utility
that captures the associated costs and benefits, under a subjective
observation of the other customers’ actions. Compared to related
works on smart grid markets and demand response [2]–[5], [7]–
[15], our paper has several new contributions: 1) in contrast
to the conventional expected utility theory (EUT), we develop
a novel PT-based framework that allows proper modeling of
realistic user behavior during energy management; 2) we design
a novel game-theoretic model that allows incorporation of both
economic (pricing) and power factors (grid regulation); and 3)
we show the existence of a mixed Nash equilibrium for the
proposed game under PT considerations. Extensive simulation
results show that deviations from the rational, EUT behavior
can lead to unexpected, and possibly undesirable performance,
in terms of power company revenues and average grid load.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents the studied system model and formulates the problem
as a game with PT considerations. In Section III, we analyze the
equilibrium for the two-player case. Simulation results are pre-
sented in Section IV, while conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PT GAME FORMULATION
Consider a smart grid in which N customers are present.
Let N be the set of all N customers. Under normal operating
conditions, we assume that each customer i ∈ N constitutes a
constant load Di on the grid. Among all N customers, a subset
K ⊆ N of K customers is assumed to be “active”. Here, an active
customer refers to a user equipped with a smart home and able to
actively participate in the energy management of the smart grid,
as allowed by the power company. Every customer k ∈ K owns a
storage unit that initially stores an amount of energy Sk<Dk. At
a given period of time, we assume that the participation of each
customer k ∈ K is restricted to one of two actions: a) charge the
needed amount Dk (act as load) or b) discharge/sell the surplus
Sk to the other customers (act as source).
Naturally, any given action by a customer k ∈ K will affect
both the power system (needed generation, losses, etc.) and the
market economics (prices). We assume that the power company
allows the customers to charge or discharge, but it requires that
the total generation power remains within a nominal, desirable
value to maintain the power system’s stability [29]. In this studied
scenario, all K participating users use storage units to charge and
discharge so as to optimize their overall monetary benefits. The
decisions of the customers are, however, largely coupled, which
leads to a game-theoretic setting as discussed next.
II-A. Noncooperative Game Model
We analyze the interactions between the active customers using
noncooperative game theory [30]. As the strategy choices of the
customers are largely interdependent, we can formulate a strategic
noncooperative game Ξ = (K, {Ak}k∈K, {uk}k∈K), that is
characterized by three main elements: a) the players are the active
customers in the set K, b) the action ak ∈ Ak := {Dk, Sk} of
each player is to either charge/buy a total amount of energy Dk
(ak = Dk) or discharge/sell the available surplus Sk (ak = Sk),
and c) the utility function uk of each player k which captures
the benefit-cost tradeoffs associated with the different choices.
Each customer k is assumed to have enough storage capacity to
handle an amount Dk + Sk. Here, we note that, although the
customers may have other demands, our model is solely focused
on the discharge/charge actions and their impact on the grid and
customers. The utility function achieved by a player k ∈ K that
chooses an action ak is given by
uk(ak ,a−k) =− α(ak ,a−k)
(
Dk + Lk(ak ,a−k)
)
+ γ(ak ,a−k)Sk − β
(
G(ak ,a−k)− Gˆ
)2
,
(1)
where a−k = [a1, a2, . . . , ak−1, ak+1, . . . , aK ] is the vector
of action choices of all players other than k, Lk(ak,a−k) are
the total losses over the distribution/transmission lines which
depend on the total demand and are computed using conventional
optimal power flow algorithms [29], G(ak,a−k) denotes the
total generation by the power company (not the customers) under
current action choices, and β is a regulation penalty factor, that
allows the power company to maintain a regulated power supply,
i.e. Gˆ. Maintaining such a regulation is important for many
operational aspects of the grid, such as the conversion between
AC and DC. We note that, in our game, the actions are positive
and we have positively/negatively defined charging/discharging
unit payments α and γ in (1). Here, we define the charging price
and the discharging price, respectively, set by the power company
and participating users as follows:
α(ak ,a−k) =
{
c(ak,a−k) if ak = Dk,
0 otherwise, (2)
with c(ak,a−k) being the unit price in the energy market which
follows the pricing strategy of the power company. Moreover,
γ(ak ,a−k) =
{
bk if ak = Sk,
0 otherwise, (3)
with bk being the unit price at which a certain customer k would
sell its surplus Sk. We assume that each customer can set its own
price, but the power company will impose a pricing restriction
B, such that bk < B, ∀k ∈ K.
The utility function in (1) captures both the economic benefits
of customer participation as well as the impact on the power
system (via the regulation term). Here, while the power company
allows the K active customers to actively decide on whether to
buy or sell energy, it mandates that the generated power in the
considered geographical area remains within desired, stable op-
erating conditions. Also, we note that both demand and line loss
determine the total generation level and, excessive charging or
discharging might damage the generator due to a frequency vari-
ation thus requiring regulation [31]. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the normal, stable operating conditions correspond
to the case in which all N customers act as loads and we let
Gˆ =
∑
i∈N (Di+Li) denote the total generated power required
for this distribution area during normal operation. Li represents
the losses incurred over the distribution/transmission lines for
delivering Di to customer i which depend on the total demand
and are computed using power flow algorithms. Therefore, for
the case in which ak = Dk,∀k ∈ K, we have G(a) = Gˆ (with
a being the vector of all strategies). Consequently, any actions
taken by a certain customer that shifts the generated power from
its nominal value Gˆ will require the power company to regulate
the generation. The need for this regulation indirectly yields a
cost penalty on the active participants as captured in (1).
II-B. Expected Utility Theory
In a smart grid, owing to uncertainty in power generation as
well as the fact that the customers can make certain decisions
(such as whether to allow the use of their storage device or not)
with different frequency over time, it is reasonable to assume
that customers make probabilistic choices. Therefore, we are
interested in studying the game under mixed strategies [30].
As customers are often uncertain when presented with different
choices in practice, a mixed-strategy solution can better capture
their realistic behavior. Let p = [p1, . . . , pk] be the vector of all
mixed strategies, where, for every customer k ∈ K, pk(ak) is the
probability distribution over the pure strategies ak ∈ Ak.
Under the conventional EUT model, the utility of each user
is simply the expected value over its mixed strategies. Thus, the
EUT utility of a player k is given by
UEUTk (p) =
∑
a∈A
( K∏
l=1
pl(al)
)
uk(ak ,a−k), (4)
where a is the vector of all players’ strategies and A = A1 ×
A2 × · · · × AK .
II-C. Prospect Theory
As previously mentioned, EUT evaluates an objective expected
utility in which users are assumed to act rationally and objec-
tively. However, it has been observed that, in real life, users’
behavior deviates considerably from the rational path predicted
by EUT. For the proposed game, a customer k has to decide on its
action, in the face of uncertainty induced by the mixed strategies
of its opponents, which impact directly its utility as in (4). In
order to capture such behavioral factors in the proposed energy
trading game, we turn to the framework of prospect theory [19].
One important PT notion is the so-called weighting effect. In
particular, in PT [32] it is observed that in real-life decision-
making, people tend to subjectively weight uncertain outcomes.
In the proposed game, this weighting effect allows capture of
each user’s subjective evaluation on the mixed strategy of its
opponents. Thus, under PT, instead of objectively observing the
mixed strategy vector p
−k chosen by the other players, each
user perceives a weighted version of it, wk(p−k). Here, wk(·)
is a nonlinear transformation that maps an objective probability
to a subjective one. PT studies have shown that most people
could often overweight low probability outcomes and overweight
high probability outcomes [19]. Hereinafter, we assume that all
players utilize a similar weighting approach, such that wk(·) =
w(·), ∀k ∈ K. While many weighting functions exist in the PT
literature, we choose the popular Prelec function (for a given
probability σ) [32]:
w(σ) = exp(−(− lnσ)α), 0 < α ≤ 1, (5)
where α is a parameter used to characterize the distortion between
subjective and objective probability. Note that when α = 1, (5)
is reduced to the conventional EUT probability.
Under PT, the expected utility achieved by a player k, given
the weighting effect, is
UPTk (p) =
∑
a∈A
(
pk(ak)
K∏
l∈K\{k}
w(pl(al))
)
uk(ak ,a−k). (6)
Here, we assume that a player uses a subjective evaluation
only on the other players’ strategy probabilities. Thus, customer
k’s subjective evaluation of its own probability is equal to its
objective probability. Given the set of probability distributions
Pk over its set of strategies Ak , the solution of the game can be
found via the notion of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium:
Definition 1: A mixed strategy profile p∗ ∈ P =
∏K
k=1
Pk
is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if, for each player k ∈
{1, 2, . . . ,K}, we have (for either PT or EUT)
Uk(p
∗
k,p
∗
−k) ≥ Uk(pk,p
∗
−k), ∀pk ∈ Pk . (7)
III. SOLUTION: THE TWO-PLAYER CASE
To gain greater insight into the solution of the proposed game,
we analyze a case study for the scenario in which only K = 2
customers are active. In particular, we are interested in analyzing
the proper mixed Nash equilibrium of the game. A proper mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium is the solution in which each player
chooses a certain action ak with probability 0 < pk < 1. While
the existence of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is well-known
for conventional EUT games [30], it is of interest to study whether
the PT game admits such an equilibrium. Moreover, for both the
EUT and PT games, we are interested in guaranteeing a proper
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, in which the users will indeed
mix between their strategies. With this in mind, we can state the
following result:
Theorem 1: For the proposed two-player smart grid game
Ξ = (K, {Ak}k∈K, {uk}k∈K), there exists a unique, proper
mixed Nash equilibrium for both the EUT and PT games if
−c(Dk, D−k)Dk+β(Dk+Sk)
2 < bkSk < −c(Dk, S−k)Dk+
β(Dk + Sk)
2 + 2β
∏2
l=1(Dl + Sl), where k = {1, 2}.
Proof: In the proposed model, there always exists at least
one mixed NE under EUT as guaranteed by Nash’s result [30].
Thus, our proof mainly focus on finding a condition to guarantee
1) there exists a proper mixed NE under EUT and PT, and 2) such
a proper mixed NE is unique. By using the indifference principle
under EUT, a proper mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, (p∗1, p∗2),
exists when the average charging utility is equal to the average
discharging utility. For example, computing customer 1’s average
utility by p∗2, we have p∗2u1(D1, D2) + (1 − p∗2)u1(D1, S2) =
p∗2u1(S1, D2) + (1− p
∗
2)u1(S1, S2); that is,
p∗2 =
u1(S1, S2) − u1(D1, S2)
u1(D1,D2)− u1(S1,D2) + u1(S1, S2)− u1(D1, S2)
. (8)
A sufficient condition to have a proper mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium, such that 0 < p∗2 < 1, is to have
sgn
(
u1(S1, S2)−u1(D1, S2)
)
= sgn
(
u1(D1,D2)−u1(S1, D2)
)
,
(9)
where sgn(·) denotes the algebraic sign of its argument and

u1(D1,D2)= −c11(D1 + L1(D1,D2)),
u1(D1, S2)= −c12(D1 + L1(D1, S2))− β(G(D1, S2)− Gˆ)2,
u1(S1,D2)= b1S1 − β(G(S1,D2) − Gˆ)2,
u1(S1, S2) = b1S1 − β(G(S1, S2) − Gˆ)2.
(10)
On the other hand, we assume that player i’s subjective eval-
uation of its own probability is equal to its objective probability,
such that w1(p1) = p1 and w2(p2) = p2. Then, using the
indifference principle under PT, player 1’s average utility of
charging w1(p∗2)u1(D1, D2) + w1(1 − p∗2)u1(D1, S2) is equal
to its average discharging utility w1(p∗2)u1(S1, D2) + w1(1 −
p∗2)u1(S1, S2); that is,
w1(p∗2)
w1(1− p∗2)
=
u1(S1, S2)− u1(D1, S2)
u1(D1, D2)− u1(S1, D2)
> 0, (11)
which is analogous to the condition (9) under EUT. Computing
player 2’s average utility by p∗1, we also have the condition
sgn
(
u2(S1, S2)−u2(S1, D2)
)
= sgn
(
u2(D1, D2)−u2(D1, S2)
)
.
To solve (9), we need to simplify
u1(D1,D2) − u1(S1,D2)
=− c11(D1 + L1(D1,D2))− b1S1 + β(G(S1,D2)− Gˆ)
2,
=− c11(D1 + L1(D1,D2))− b1S1 + β{[D2 − S1 +Dothers
+ L(S1, D2)]− [D1 +D2 +Dothers + L(D1,D2)]}
2,
=− c11D1 − b1S1 + β(D1 + S1)
2,
(12)
where Dothers represents the total constant demand of non-
participating users. Here, we have assumed that the losses L(·)
are negligible with respect to the demand, which is a reasonable
assumption when dealing with two players only, i.e., Lk <<
Dk, k = 1, 2. Similarly,
u1(S1, S2)− u1(D1, S2)
=b1S1 − β(D1 + S1 +D2 + S2)
2 + c12D1 + β(D2 + S2)
2,
=c12D1 + b1S1 − β(D1 + S1)
2 − 2β(D1 + S1)(D2 + S2).
(13)
If (12) is greater than 0, (13) cannot be greater than 0 due to the
fact that, in practice, as the locational marginal pricing (LMP)
[33] increases with the generated power, the price at a lower
generation level cannot exceed that charged at a higher level;
thus, mathematically, c12 ≤ c11. Thus, both sides of (9) have to
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Fig. 1. Probability of charging under EUT and PT as b varies.
be negative and then, we obtain the range of bkSk in Theorem 1.
Under given loads and surpluses, Theorem 1 provides a
relationship between the unit selling price bk of each player, the
LMP price c(a1, a2), and the penalty factor for regulation β, such
that we could obtain a proper mixed strategy equilibrium. From
the utility functions in (4) and (6), we can mathematically see the
difference between EUT and PT. Here, given the players’ mixed
strategies, we define the company’s expected revenues under
the equilibrium probabilities, (p∗1, p∗2) for EUT and (p∗,PT1 , p
∗,PT
2 )
for PT. The power company generates a revenue depending on
the energy sold to the two customers, although the customers’
probability of charging or discharging can be different between
EUT and PT. Thus, the power company revenues obtained from
customers 1 and 2 are as follows:
REUT=p
∗
1p
∗
2c11(D1 +D2 + L1,2) + p
∗
1(1 − p
∗
2)c12(D1 + L1)
+ (1− p∗1)p
∗
2c21(D2 + L2),
RPT=p
∗,PT
1
p∗,PT
2
c11(D1 +D2 + L1,2) + p
∗,PT
1
(1 − p∗,PT
2
)c12
(D1 + L1) + (1− p
∗,PT
1
)p∗,PT
2
c21(D2 + L2),
(14)
where L(·) is the loss in power flow (1). REUT is the expected
revenue obtained by the power company. And RPT is the PT
revenue obtained by the power company, in which player 1 and
player 2 use their subjective perspectives.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For simulating the proposed system, we consider a geo-
graphical region in which two active customers equipped with
storage units exist. We choose typical values for the demand and
surplus: D1 = 20 kWh, D2 = 15 kWh, S1 = 10 kWh, S2 =
5 kWh, α = 0.25, β = 0.0018. The constant load is set as 200
kWh, and power line parameters are set from a typical 4-bus
system [34]. The following examples assume that the generation
power (kW) is numerically equal to the energy (kWh) in a one-
hour time unit. For pricing, we assume that c(a1, a2) follows a
conventional LMP scheme, such as the following:
c=


$0.05/kWh power company generation is ≤ 200 kWh,
$0.10/kWh power company generation between 200−250 kWh,
$0.15/kWh power company generation between 250−300 kWh,
$0.20/kWh power company generation is > 300 kWh.
In Fig. 1, we depict the impact of the unit selling price on the
behavior of the customers. Without loss of generality, we assume
that both customers use the same price b1 = b2 = b and we
vary the price within the range in which the equilibrium exist as
per Theorem 1. Fig. 1 shows how the probability of charging for
both players varies as b increases, for both the EUT and PT cases.
Clearly, as the selling price increases, both players would have
more incentive to discharge than to charge, as the benefit would
start outweighing the regulation penalty. More interestingly, Fig. 1
shows that, for both customers, the PT behavior significantly
differs from the EUT behavior. For example, for customer 2,
below a selling price of b = $0.07 per kWh, the probability of
charging at the equilibrium for PT is much higher than EUT.
This implies that for low gains, each customer follows a more
conservative, risk-averse strategy under PT and is less interested
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Fig. 2. Total revenue for the power company under EUT and PT as the
individual customer selling price b varies.
in reaping the benefits of selling energy than in the EUT case.
However, as the selling price crosses the threshold, the probability
of charging for customer 2 under PT becomes much smaller
than under EUT. This implies that once the selling benefits are
significant (and the risks decrease), customer 2 starts selling more
aggressively under PT than under EUT. A similar behavior can
be observed for customer 1, although the benefit threshold of
customer 1 is smaller (b = $0.05), since customer 1 has more
energy to sell/buy.
Fig. 2 evaluates the total revenues of the power company in
(14) as the customers’ unit selling price b increases, for both PT
and EUT. Fig. 2 clearly shows that, as the unit selling price of
the customers increases, the total revenue of the power company
will decrease, as the customers start to sell more and buy less.
Further, we can clearly see how the deviations from the EUT
behavior, as predicted by PT can have a major impact on the
market. First, as the customers’ unit selling price is below about
$0.06 per kWh, under PT, the total revenue collected would be
much higher than that expected under EUT. In contrast, if the
customers are allowed to set prices that are higher than $0.06
per kWh (and basically higher than the minimum unit price of
the company’s LMP model), PT predicts that the total revenue
will be much smaller than in the EUT case. In this case, it is more
beneficial for the power company to regulate the customers’ unit
selling price to be below $0.06 per kWh (which is comparable to
the minimum LMP price of $0.05 per kWh). Fig. 2 demonstrates
the importance of incorporating the customers’ behavior into the
analysis of the power market. In particular, if the power company
utilizes EUT to regulate the customers’ selling price, in practice,
this may incur losses in revenues (relative to EUT) if realistic user
behavior models are not accounted for. Finally, we note that the
“crossing point” between PT and EUT in Fig. 2 depends largely
on β. As β becomes higher, a higher unit selling price would be
required for the customers to more aggressively sell energy.
In Fig. 3, we show that the expected load on the grid
significantly differs between PT and EUT. For PT, when the
unit price for buying energy is small, the customers are less
interested (compared to EUT) in selling energy now. However,
as the unit price crosses a threshold, the customers will sell
more aggressively and, thus, the overall load on the grid will be
smaller than expected. Fig. 3 can provide important guidelines
for demand-side management in the smart grid. For example,
assume the power company wants to increase its price to drive
customers to sell more and reduce their average load to about
10 kWh while keeping the generation regulation within limits.
Based on EUT, the company would have to increase the minimum
LMP price to roughly $0.077 per kWh. In reality, because users
behave subjectively when faced with risk, the company does not
need to introduce such a high price increase. In contrast, it can
increase it to about $0.06 per kWh and obtain the desired load
reduction. On the other hand, if the company wants to reduce its
price to sustain up to 23 kWh of load (from the two customers
in question), based on EUT, it would have to offer a relatively
low price of $0.035 per kWh. In contrast, based on PT, a price
of about $0.047 per kWh can achieve the same impact yet yield
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more profits. Clearly, ignoring the fact that users’ behavior can
deviate from the rational EUT path can yield undesirable loads
on the grid which further motivates the need for PT analysis.
In Fig. 4, we show how the power company revenues under
EUT and PT vary as the regulation parameter β increases. In
particular, we vary β from 0.0014 to 0.0024 while satisfying the
existence of a proper mixed Nash equilibrium. First, the solid
lines show that the revenue under EUT is concave. This is due
to the fact that the objective probability of charging is computed
from a nonlinear utility that integrates power regulation. As the
parameter β increases, both players want to store/charge more,
since discharging increases the penalty of power regulation. Also,
we can see that, after the crossing point (i.e β = 0.0018 when
b = 0.06), the power company would obtain a high revenue from
the PT actions of players. This is because players are more likely
to charge (act more conservatively) at a high β comparable to
their objective action. Thus, the power company must choose an
optimal β while balancing the tradeoff between its own revenues
and effective customer participation via discharging.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have introduced a novel approach for studying
the problem of customer-owned energy storage integration in the
smart grid. We have developed a novel game-theoretic approach,
based on prospect theory, using which each player subjectively
observes and determines its actions so as to optimize a utility
function that captures the benefit from selling energy as well as
the associated regulation penalty. For the two-player scenario, we
have shown the existence of an equilibrium for both EUT and PT.
Simulation results have shown that prospect theory enables the
power company to better decide on its pricing parameters, given
realistic behavior of the users which deviate considerably from
conventional EUT behavior. This paper only scratches the surface
of prospect theory, which is expected to become a key technique
in the design and analysis of a user-centric smart grid.
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